

Family policy in the context of social change and post-industrialism: A study of family policy positions among Finnish parties 1970-2007

Mikael Nygård, *Åbo Akademi University, Finland*

Nygård, M. (2010) "Family policy in the context of social change and post-industrialism – a study of family policy positions among Finnish parties 1970-2007",
Social & Public Policy Review, 4, 1, pp. 50-16.

Family policy in the context of social change and post-industrialism – a study of family policy positions among Finnish parties 1970-2007

MIKAEL NYGÅRD

University lecturer in social policy,
Åbo Akademi University, Finland

Abstract

Since the 1970s the family structure and labour participation patterns of parents in Finland have undergone fundamental changes. At the same time the policy-making context has changed as a consequence of increasing economic openness, competitiveness and shrinking manoeuvrability for national decision-makers. The article investigates how these changes have influenced the family policy positions of six Finnish parties by analysing how family policy target groups and policy demands have been portrayed in election manifestos during the period 1970-2007. Moreover, the study aims at assessing the convergence of family policy profiles over time. The results show that partisan family policy positions have been influenced by social needs of 'new' risk groups and that there has been an overall shift from a policy orientation that emphasises income transfers and publically provided well-being of families to an orientation more focussed on increasing the labour market participation of parents by improving the availability of childcare and facilitating work/family balance for parents. Although some systematic differences in family policy profiles are discernable, there are signs of increasing convergence between parties as to how they perceive the means and ends of public family policy.

Key words

Family Policy; Post-Industrialism; Social Change; Risk; Party Politics; Finland

Introduction

During the post-war period there has been a shift towards a greater state responsibility for families in most industrialised countries although parents still remain the main providers of economic and social welfare for children (Kamerman and Kahn, 2003). In recent decades, this public engagement in the family has become challenged by the emergence of so-called new social risks, such as falling levels of fertility and changing household structures (Wehner and Abrahamson 2006; Taylor-Gooby, 2004; Esping-Andersen, 1999). At the same time there have also been significant changes in the policy context that have put national decision-makers under increasing financial constraints and made credit-seeking social reforms less feasible (Pierson, 2001; 1996). Moreover the decision-making process in national welfare states is today characterised by a higher degree of uncertainty, which, in combination with the globalisation process, has made politicians increasingly susceptible to transnational idea diffusion and social learning (Hulme, 2005; Hay and Rosamond, 2002; Hall, 1993).

By building on a combined conflict-oriented and ideational theoretical perspective, the article aims at assessing the impact of ‘new’ social risks and globalisation on the family policy positions of Finnish parties by scrutinising election manifestos from the period 1970-2007. This overall aim can be divided into three research questions:

- To what extent and in what ways have so-called new social risks, such as single parenthood, been recognized by political parties?
- Has there been a shift in family policy choices that have made parties more favourably disposed towards general labour-market policies instead of traditional income transfers to families?
- Are there differences between different parties regarding their family policy positions and have these differences become less prominent over time?

We argue that there has been an increasing recognition of new social risks in election programs since the 1970s as a consequence of socioeconomic changes, such as changes in the household structure. As a result of post-industrialism and globalisation, there has also been an overall shift from a policy orientation that emphasises income transfers and the publically provided well-being of families to an orientation more focused on increasing the labour market participation of parents by improving the availability of childcare and facilitating work/family balance for parents. Although some systematic differences in family policy profiles still seem to persist, there are signs of increasing convergence between parties as to how they perceive of the means and ends of public family policy.

The article begins with a description of the main characteristics of the Finnish family policy system and the main policy changes that have taken place

since the 1970s. Secondly, some theoretical perspectives on the changes in parties' family policy positions are discussed. Thirdly, we outline the changes in family policy positions and discuss plausible explanations to these changes. Ultimately the results are summed up and discussed.

The Finnish family policy system

Finland is often considered a member of the Nordic family policy model (Bradshaw and Hatland, 2006; Hiilamo, 2002), the dual-earner model (Korpi, 2000) or the individual model (Sainsbury, 1994). Finnish family policy is characterised by individual social rights and relatively comprehensive income transfers and services to families with children. Another characteristic is the prominence of dual-earner households, high levels of female employment and low degrees of family poverty (Forssén *et al.*, 2008; Ferrarini, 2006).

In the post-war period the emphasis in Finnish family policy shifted from the idea of poor relief towards the idea of income transfers as individual social rights. The introduction of child allowances in 1948 was the first step towards a universal income transfer system for families with children. The next wave of family policy reforms came in the 1960s as the parental insurance system was established in 1963, compensating for costs due to pregnancy and delivery by giving mothers the right to daily allowances during maternity leave (Forssén *et al.*, 2008; Hiilamo, 2002). In the 1970s, the issue of public day care services for children came to the fore of the policy debate. The Child Day Care Act, which was enacted in 1973, guaranteed the right to day care for all children needing care and gave families – at least theoretically – a universal right to day care services. The reform did not, however, offer an immediate remedy for the shortages of day care places and violated the principle of universalism as the intake was largely based on parents' capacity to pay for the care (Anttonen and Sipilä, 2000). The demand for an extension of day care supply was once again put forward during the Early-80s as the system of home care support for children was introduced on an experimental basis. In 1985, the child home care allowance became a consolidated part of a larger policy package that reinforced the principle of universal day care and gradually extended the rights for parents of children under three to either use public day care or to receive home care allowance (Hiilamo, 2002; Anttonen and Sipilä, 2000).

By the early 1990s, Finnish family policy had evolved into a comprehensive system of income transfers and social services that ranked high in international comparison (e.g. Gauthier, 1996). In the years to come, however, several cutbacks were made due to the recession that hit Finnish economy. At first these cutbacks were made mainly in the parental insurance system through a lowering of the replacement rates of parental allowances (Hiilamo, 2006). Later on, in 1995, the 'rainbow' coalition led by the Social Democrats also made child allowances and home care allowances targets of cutbacks (Karisto *et al.*, 1998;

Kosunen, 1997). Also the calculation formula for parental allowances was tightened, linking benefit levels closer to previous earnings and weakening low-income groups' rights to earnings-related parental benefits. In 1996, parents with low incomes were completely excluded from the system of income-related parental allowances. Instead low-incomers had to rely on a minimum allowance that equalled the basic amount of the home care allowance. In contrast to the income-related parental insurance, this minimum allowance was not adjusted to inflation until in 2002. One year later, in 1997, the home care allowance also became a target for reform as the basic amount was replaced by a cash support that was significantly lower than the previous allowance. At the same time, a new income transfer for supporting privately produced childcare was introduced, which meant that the freedom of choice in childcare was increased (Hiilamo, 2006).

It should be noted that some improvements in family policy services were also accomplished in the 1990s. First and foremost, day care services for children were expanded in 1990 as all children under three were guaranteed a so-called subjective right to public day care. This reform made childcare services truly universal and secured parents' rights to choose between publicly provided childcare and publicly supported home care. Furthermore it gave parents the right to stay home with children under three years without endangering their employment contracts. In 1996, the subjective right to public childcare was extended to all children under school age, which significantly increased the number of children in public day care (Forssén *et al.*, 2008; Hiilamo, 2002).

In the 2000s, the economic recovery allowed the Finnish government to make some improvements in the family transfer system. For instance, in 2002 the minimum parental allowance was restored and in 2003 the paternal leave was lengthened, guaranteeing the right to a full 'daddy month' under the condition that the father also uses a part of the joint parental leave (Hiilamo, 2006). In 2004, the child allowance and the child supplement to single parents were raised. Also the right to partial leave for parents with children on the first and second grade was extended. In 2005, the home care allowance was raised by approximately €40 per month and two years later some improvements were made in maternity and parent insurance benefits. The replacement rate of maternity insurance benefits was increased to 90 per cent for the first 56 days and parental benefits were raised to 75 per cent for the first 30 days (STM, 2007; STM, 2006a). In 2008 the child supplement to single parents was increased and one year later the minimum parental insurance allowance was raised to the same level as basic unemployment benefits. Simultaneously, child allowances for the third child, home care allowances, private care allowances and maintenance allowances were raised (STM, 2008).

Contrasting old and new family risks

The modernisation process during the twentieth-century brought with it a number of unique social constellations that were to lay the foundations of post-war western welfare states. For example, male wage labour became the norm of industrialised societies whereas the nuclear family model with its specific gender roles turned into the leading household type (Beck, 1986). Accordingly, the task for traditional family policy was to compensate for the costs of children and to preserve the male-breadwinner institution, by preventing social risks, such as unemployment or poverty, from endangering the economic well-being of families (Ferrarini, 2006; Montanari, 2000; Gauthier, 1996; Wennemo, 1994). Later in the post-war period, however, the needs of families started to become more diversified as a consequence of individualisation, household variety and higher labour participation among women (e.g. Taylor-Gooby, 2004; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Esping-Andersen, 1999). Allegedly, these changes gave birth to a number of so-called new social risks, such as shortage of childcare for mothers seeking paid jobs, postponed motherhood and falling fertility rates. Due to the increasing female labour participation and the growing number of single mothers, it became increasingly difficult for parents (notably women) to balance work and family.

Due to the growing variety of households, different governmental approaches in family policy and changing labour markets, the problem of unequal distribution of income between different families became evident in the 80s and the 90s. This meant that the number of poor households including children started to increase (Taylor-Gooby, 2004; Esping-Andersen *et al.*, 2002). In order to tackle these risks, welfare states started to invest in a variety of ‘new’ family policies (Häusermann, 2006; Esping-Andersen *et al.*, 2002), such as public childcare services, privately financed services and so-called work/family policies that seek to facilitate the balance between work and family by, for instance, extending parental leaves or shortening working hours etc. (OECD, 2007; Leira, 2006). At the same time, however, welfare states started to face increasing difficulties in maintaining high social expenditure levels due to the international economic openness and competition. All in all, this has created a situation where ambitions to safeguard the economic well-being of families, as well as income equality, have become increasingly hampered by commitments to cost containment and efforts to secure the economic sustainability of the welfare state (Taylor-Gooby, 2004).

The discussion about new social risks and new family policy is in many ways relevant for the Nordic countries and Finland, although some of the changes mentioned above did occur much earlier in Nordic countries compared to continental and Mediterranean countries (Forssén *et al.*, 2008). In Finland, as an example, women’s entry into paid work occurred on a large scale already in the 1960s. In 1970 the share of women in paid work was 63.5 %, whereas the

corresponding shares in Germany and Great Britain were 48.1 % and 53.5 %, respectively (OECD, 2004). Moreover, dual-earner households, individual social rights, and gender equality became elements of Nordic family policy already in the 1970s (Ferrarini, 2006; Mayhew, 2006; Hiilamo, 2002). Finally, the demand for ‘new’ family policies has generally been considered more accentuated in countries where fertility levels have been historically low, such as the Mediterranean countries (e.g. Esping-Andersen *et al.*, 2002). By contrast, levels of fertility have been fairly high in Nordic countries (e.g. Rijken, 2006).

The distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ social risks can nevertheless be used as a theoretical starting point for studying the ways that Finnish parties construct family policy needs. Here, four processes are of special interest: the emergence of new households and family types, the difficulties of balancing work and family, the emergence of a child-policy perspective, and the question of equality in economic well-being among families with or without children. The first process refers to the increasing number of divorces, single-parent households and other new family forms, such as so-called stepfamilies or homosexual families. As these phenomena become more widespread, they create ‘new’ social needs that claim state recognition, for example, in the form of maintenance allowances, tax deductions or single-mother supplements (cf. Wehner and Abrahamson, 2006). Since 1970, the crude divorce rate has climbed from a little over 6,000 divorces to 13,255 divorces in 2006 (Statistics, Finland, 2008). Simultaneously, there has been a change in the number of single-parent households, increasing from 10 % of all families in 1970 up to 18 % in 2000 (Hakovirta, 2006: 29).

The second issue, the question of work/family balance, refers primarily to the task of facilitating mothers’ paid work and consequently to securing continued economic growth in times when the traditional bulk of workers threatens to become too small. It is also about gender equality and equal opportunities for women and men, for example by giving fathers incentives to participate in unpaid work within the family. For example, it has been argued that ‘as long there are people who are constrained in their choices about work/family balance, the result may be both too few babies and too little employment and/or unsatisfactory careers’ (OECD, 2007: 12). Accordingly, the balance of work/family is facilitated through, among other things, legislation on equal pay, publically financed childcare services, private day care, pre-school education, part-time childcare leaves, rules on sabbatical leaves and shortened working-hours etc. (OECD, 2007).

The third process, the emergence of a child perspective within family policy, is related to both international developments of human rights, such as the *UN Convention on the Rights of the Child* in 1989 (Kamerman and Kahn, 2003; Bartley, 1998; Gauthier, 1996; Therborn, 1993), and an escalation of the number of child-related social problems since the 1990s (STM, 2006b). The fourth question, question of distribution of economic well-being between families, refers

to public policy measures for regulating the income distribution among families with and without children. Since the 1990s, the distribution of disposable income between different types of families with children has become more uneven. Dual-earner families with two or more children have become better off while single-parent families and multi-children families have been placed in a worse-off situation. Furthermore, the relative number of children living in poor families has grown during the 1990s (Moisio, 2006; Statistics, Finland, 2006; Kangas and Ritakallio, 2005; Bardy *et al.*, 2001).

By and large, these social changes and policy discourses can be expected to have influenced partisan family policy constructions in several ways. First, it seems plausible that parties have started to recognise the needs of ‘new’ risk groups (e.g. single-parent families) to a higher extent than before. Therefore, in this article we analyse the programmatic space that ‘traditional’ risk groups have received in relation to so-called new risk groups over time (the *who*-dimension). Second, it is likely that the above mentioned development has had an impact also on the policy solutions offered by parties. Since the policy options of decision-makers tend to have become more constrained by commitments to fiscal austerity and international competitiveness (e.g. Taylor-Gooby, 2001) we can expect that partisan manifestos have become more disposed to solving or even obfuscating these ‘new’ risks by activating policy measures and cost containment. ‘Traditional’ income transfers on the other hand are portrayed as increasingly impracticable (see the discussion in the next section). Therefore, we analyse whether the programmes display a shift from traditional ‘income’ strategies to activating ‘labour’ strategies over time (the *what*-dimension).

Parties and family policy

In this section we discuss the relationship between parties and family policy. Today, various theoretical explanations to the development of family policy can be found, some emphasising evolutionary aspects by explaining family policy changes as a function of changing social needs (Gauthier, 1996), while others focus on the political struggle between conflicting interests or ideas and the outcomes they have on income transfers or services to families (Ferrarini, 2006; Montanari, 2000; Wennemo, 1994). Lately, these traditional explanations have been challenged by yet another stream emphasising the role of ideas for policy change (Kuebler, 2007; Henderson and White, 2004). This article departs from the notion that parties play a vital role for welfare policies, although their role, admittedly, is somewhat changed in comparison to the ‘Golden Age’ of popular welfare-state expansion (Huber and Stephens, 2001). Due to significant changes in the policy context, such as a higher degree of international openness and competitiveness, parties operate within stricter frames of manoeuvrability and higher degrees of uncertainty, which is likely to increase the role of transnational idea diffusion and social learning (Hulme, 2005; Hall, 1993).

Not only do parties react to socio-economic changes and changes in economic settings, they also actively participate in constructing social problems and policy goals according to ideological values and interests (Hiilamo and Kangas, 2006). According to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1999), parties conceive of policy needs according to cognitive biases, so called *policy belief systems*, which provide heuristic guidance in complex situations. Implemented in this article, this concept can help us to understand party positions on family policy as constructions that are formulated according to three different dimensions: a deep core of fundamental normative and ontological axioms about the world; a policy core consisting of strategic considerations for achieving deep core beliefs; and a set of secondary aspects that employ the information available as well as instrumental considerations necessary for implementing the policy core.

Regarding the first dimension, earlier research shows that there have existed ideological differences between left-wing and right-wing parties in Finland as to the extent and type of public family policy they desire. Whereas left-wing parties, notably the Social Democrats, have generally advocated public day care services and income redistribution between rich and poor families, conservative parties, notably the National Coalition and the Centre Party, have been more in favour of horizontal transfers, tax deductions and child home care allowances (Nygård, 2007, Hiilamo and Kangas, 2006; Välimäki and Rauhala, 2000; Ervasti, 1996; Kangas, 1986). Furthermore, family policy positions have been closely connected with basic values, such as what the overall role of the family in society, gender roles and the work division between spouses (Zimmerman, 2001). For instance, conservative parties have generally favoured a traditional view on the family where spouses occupy differentiated roles and the single-earner model is the norm (Van Kersbergen, 1995; Hinnfors, 1992; Budge and Robertson, 1987). By contrast, left-wing and green parties tend to criticise such traditional ideas in favour of more individualised and gender-neutral conceptions of the family (Zilliacus, 2001). Evidence from comparative research also supports the idea that there are links between the ideological background factors and the structure of family policy systems in the Western world (Ferrarini, 2006; Castles, 2004; Montanari, 2000; Wennemo, 1994).

As to the second dimension, the policy core, party positions on family policies have normally been highly conditioned by constitutional factors, such as the parliamentary status of parties, or by strategic considerations that pertain to the party's ambition to maximise the number of votes in competition with rival parties. Incumbent parties, for instance, are generally more constrained by fiscal realities in their actions than are parties in opposition (Kitschelt, 2001). Yet, family policy reforms can be utilised as credit-seeking instruments in order to secure future voter support (Pierson, 2001) for an incumbent party. As an example, the Finnish day care reform in 1973 was in many ways a credit-seeking manoeuvre concerted by the Social Democrats in order to secure voter support in

times diminishing class voting among the electorate (Anttonen, 1999; Ervasti, 1996).

Regarding the third aspect of family policy positioning, increasing fiscal constraints due to post-industrialism, enhanced competitiveness and opening world markets have limited the state's capacity to deliver publically financed welfare (Pierson, 2001; Kosonen, 2001; Taylor-Gooby, 2001). This has resulted in cost containment and an overall prudence towards expansive social policy, which is likely to have influenced parties' family policy positions since the beginning of the 1990s. Notably the recession in the Early-90s brought with it significant cutbacks and reforms of major social policy programs in Finland (Timonen, 2003; Nygård, 2003). Also the EU and supra-national organisations like the OECD or IMF have started to exert considerable pressure on national welfare states making politicians more prone to social learning and mainstreaming of policy repertoires (Christensen, 2006; Kosonen, 2004).

In sum, instead of fighting for extended social rights for their constituencies, today the parties face increasing fiscal austerity and competitiveness that make old-school 'popular' family policy-making increasingly difficult. In this situation of increasing complexity and uncertainty, the influence of international policy ideas and paradigms become more significant for policy positions, and traditional class-based interests are challenged or even superseded by 'new' policy alternatives that emanate from influential ideas or paradigms (Hulme, 2005; Dolowitz *et al.*, 2000; Campbell, 1998). One such idea is the issue of balancing work and family. Building on the fear for declining populations, labour-supply shortages and incompatibilities in balancing work and family, this theme has become increasingly influential for family policy solutions in most contemporary welfare states since the 1990s (OECD, 2007; MacInness, 2006).

Methods and data

In order to test the hypotheses stated in the beginning of the article, we performed quantitative content analyses of election manifestos from the period 1970-2007 (Krippendorff, 2004). Political parties constitute a link between society and government that materialises during parliamentary elections, making election campaigns vital periods of political communication between voters and their representatives. In spite of the competition from media and on-line information channels, election manifestos still play an important role as information sources for voters in these processes (Budge and McDonald, 2006; Strandberg, 2006). They can thus be seen as official policy declarations that depict the parties' constructions of the relationship between the state, the family and the labour market.

The analysed parties consisted of the six largest parties in Finland; the National Coalition (NC), the Swedish People's Party (SPP), the Centre Party


(CP), the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Left Wing Alliance, formerly the Finnish People's Democratic Union (LEFT), and the Green League (GL). The coded manifestos totalled 61 and emanated from 11 elections between 1970 and 2007 (1970, 1972, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003 and 2007). Official manifestos became available for the Green League in 1991; therefore only five programmes from this party were included. Moreover, since some of the parties did not publish official election programmes every election year we were compelled to use other corresponding programmes, such as manifestations of short term policy goals, as substitutes.

The content of the manifestos was coded in February 2007 by using a coding manual including 14 family policy themes (see Appendix 1). These thematic categories were constructed *a priori* (Weber, 1990) on the basis of earlier research on partisan family policy positions (e.g. Kangas, 1986). Election programmes served both as registering units and context units (Krippendorff, 2004). In order to assess the stability of the coding instrument, certain parts of the programmes were re-coded about a month later. A test of the stability (intra-reliability), conducted with Holsti's reliability test (Holsti, 1969), showed a rather high degree of stability ($r = .96$). Moreover, by letting another person recode parts of the programmes, we could assess also the degree of objectivity (inter-reliability) in coding by using Holsti's test. Also here the results indicated a rather high degree of concordance ($r = .89$).

Findings

In this section we present the findings of our research. In general, there has been an overall increase in partisan family policy interest since the 1970s. A smaller culmination of programmatic attention occurred already in the Late-1970s, but since the Late-1990s there has been a steady and continuous increase of partisan interest in the family (Figure 1). This development is partly related to the evolution of international legislation and policy recommendations. As an example, the UN declarations of the Women's Year (1975) and the Year of the Child (1979) enhanced the national policy development within the domains of family and child policy (Therborn, 1993).

Figure 1. The total number of family policy standpoints in election programmes for all parties 1970-2007.



Note: The figure shows how many of the 14 thematic categories in the coding manual that parties have touched upon in their election programmes for each election year.

Another explanation is incremental; since policy claims are dependent on previous policy achievements, parties have generally been less prone to present policy claims right after substantial reforms have been carried out. An example is the downfall in partisan interest during the Mid-90s. Much of this downfall can also be attributed to the deep recession that hit Finland during this period. As partisan emphases on family policy tend to decrease during periods of economic hardship it is not surprising that we can detect a fall in programmatic attention on family policy during the 90s (ct. Hiilamo, 2002). A closer look at the development of singular party profiles (not reported here) reveals a rather convergent development over time, despite a tangible divergence in the Early-1970s and Mid-1990s that, at least partly, can be attributed to the economic fluctuations and different parliamentary positions of parties. Since the Mid-1970s the emphasis on family policy has grown considerably in all parties' programmes. Partly this has to do with the fact that family policy was established as an own policy area and was given a natural place in manifestos together with issues like employment policy or economic policy (Kangas, 1986). It should however be noted that this seemingly converging development only tells us something about the similarity in overall emphasis, it does not say anything about the degree of accord or conformity in party profiles.


An important explanation to the overall growth in partisan family policy attention is also to be found in the increasing recognition of new social risks and changing social needs among families. This draws our attention to the first research question of the article. By using the 14 thematic categories as starting point we could obtain a detailed assessment of the impact that so-called new risk groups have had on partisan manifestos over time. The categories were therefore reorganised into two main categories; the *who*-category, pertaining to which social categories – or risk groups – the manifestos address (e.g. families with children, women etc.), and the *what*-category, concerning policy measures that parties propose (e.g. income transfers, day care services etc.). In each category we then made a distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ issues. By registering and comparing the frequencies of each category, we obtained an instrument for assessing the magnitude of change in partisan family policy positions.

As shown in Figure 2, where traditional risk groups are contrasted with new ones, there has been a rapid growth in public awareness of the needs of new family types, women and children since the Early-90s, while traditional categories (like families with children) have not received the same amount of attention in manifestos.

This result is in conjunction with the fact that there was a sharp increase in the crude divorce rate in the Late-80s and that different types of so-called new family types, for instance single-parent families and transformed nuclear families (‘step’ families), became more common during the 1990s. In the 1980s and 1990s there was also an increase in the awareness of children’s rights as well as different problems concerning childhood conditions. Partly this awareness was related to international conventions and policy recommendations. For instance, in 1991 the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) came into force in Finland making the child perspective an inevitable aspect of all social-political decision-making.

Likewise, as shown in Figure 3 there has also been an overall shift from a policy orientation that emphasises incomes transfers to an orientation that focuses on labour policies, such as public day care services, educational efforts and measures for facilitating the reconciliation of work and family. This shift, which pertains to our second research question, is visible already in the manifestos from 1987, but becomes even more tangible in the manifestos from the 1990s and the 2000s. By contrast, claims for improved income transfers to families have not been accentuated in the same way, although we can also here detect an increase of standpoints since the Late-90s. A growing concern for the economic wellbeing of families, especially poor families with children, has increased the number of claims for higher child allowances, home care allowances and parental-insurance benefits, especially among the right-wing parties (NC and CP) and the greens.


Figure 2. The number of coded standpoints concerning 'old' and 'new' family policy risk groups in election programmes for all parties 1970-2007



Note: Variables that represented 'old' risk groups are variables 1, 3 and 4, whereas variables 9, 12 and 14 represent 'new' risk groups.

Nevertheless, on the whole the results tend to support our assumptions by indicating that Finnish politicians have become more hesitant towards using public funds for safeguarding the economic well-being of families, whereas to a much higher extent they tend to point out higher labour-market participation as a general remedy for families in economic distress. Not only is a higher labour participation considered a good thing for families, it is also viewed as a vital prerequisite for the future sustainability of the Finnish welfare state, since an increase of the labour force strengthens the funding base. In sum, the findings so far tend to confirm that there has been a visible shift in the overall family policy profile of Finnish parties. Rather than demanding that the economic well-being of families should be improved through income transfers, they opt for activating measures that intend to maximise the labour force participation of parents. Allegedly, massive improvements of income transfers are considered unrealistic due to increasing financial constraints on state spending, demographic changes and a general reluctance to finance higher transfers by higher taxation (ct. Taylor-Gooby, 2004; Esping-Andersen *et al.*, 2002).

Figure 3. The number of coded standpoints advocating 'income' strategies and 'labour' strategies in election programmes for all parties 1970-2007



Note: Variables 2, 5 and 7 represent 'old' policy measures (i.e. 'income' strategies), while variables 6, 11 and 13 represent 'new' policy measures (i.e. 'labour' strategies)

The discussion has so far concerned the first two research questions of the article. Let us now turn to the third that touches on the issue of party differences and the question of family policy convergence over time. One way of assessing the degree of accord in party profiles is to compare the overall number of statements that parties have made concerning different aspects of family policy (see Table 1). The comparison reveals some interesting differences in the ways that parties have conceived of family-policy target groups.

First, the number of general but unspecified claims for family support is larger in right-wing than in left-wing manifestos, which suggests that the family as a social category has a pronounced intrinsic value in the ideological structure of conservative parties. This observation is also supported by the stronger pronouncement of claims concerning horizontal equality in right-wing manifestos, i.e. claims that highlight the position of families with children in relation to families without children. The idea of compensating families for the costs of child rearing, or levelling incomes between non-child families and families with children, is thus more salient in rightist manifestos than in leftist manifestos (ct. Taylor, 2007; Van Kersbergen 1995; Kangas, 1986). By contrast, the idea of supporting large or poor families (so-called vertical equality) receives

only marginal support in the manifestos, without any discernible differences in emphasis between rightist and leftist parties.

Table 1. The number of election programmes containing standpoints on family policy target groups and policy demands 1970-2007

	NC	CP	SPP	SDP	LEFT	GL
Who?						
General family standpoints	8	10	9	7	4	1
Families with children	5	7	2	3	2	3
Poor or large families with children	1	3	0	1	3	2
Women, gender equality	3	2	9	8	8	5
Children	0	3	5	5	7	3
New family types	2	4	2	3	3	3
What?						
Income transfers	6	7	7	4	6	3
Tax reliefs or deductions	6	5	2	0	0	1
Home care allowance	9	9	3	0	1	2
Public day care	6	5	10	8	9	4
Education and pre-schools	4	4	3	6	3	3
Reconciliation of work/family	4	5	4	6	4	4
Child protection	2	3	4	1	2	2
Other	8	9	9	5	6	2

Note: The table shows the number of election programs that include standpoints on the 14 categories/variables included in the coding manual (see appendix 1). The categories have been organised in two groups according to whether they pertain to family-policy target groups (Who?) or policy demands (What?). Each party could obtain a total value of 11 for each variable (11 parliamentary elections) except for GL for whom the total number of election programmes was 5. Frequencies over 5 are marked in bold, except for the GL where frequencies over 2 are marked in bold.

Second, there are some noticeable differences between parties as to how women's and children's issues are addressed in election programmes. Categories advocating gender equality as well as women's and children's rights have received considerably more attention in left-wing manifestos and the manifestos of the SPP and GL than in conservative ones. Traditionally, conservative parties, like the NC and CP, have strongly supported the idea of the nuclear family and have been reluctant to addressing 'new' risk categories in their manifestos. On the other hand, liberal and leftist parties started to address these topics already in the 1970s and 1980s. Interestingly, the GL is the only party that has openly recognised the situation of homosexual and immigrant families in their manifestos.

As to the question of which kind of family policy measures parties have been preferred, there are also a number of striking differences between parties. In

general, rightist parties have been more in favour of cash transfers, tax deductions and home care allowances, whereas leftist parties have tended to support public day care services. The SPP has taken a middle position here, as it strongly advocates both cash transfers and public day care services. Also the GL has advocated a multitude of policy measures ranging from cash benefits and home care allowances to public child-care. Regarding categories like education, reconciliation of work/family and child protection, there seems to be no visible differences between right-wing and left-wing parties, since these issues have been recognised in a similar way in all parties. However, there are some differences between parties as to the last category, 'other issues'. The NC, CP and SPP have strongly advocated public provision of social housing for young families. Moreover they have strongly emphasised that society should support and encourage parenthood and provide parents with freedom of choice regarding child-care. By contrast, the 'other' claims made by leftist parties have generally pertained to enhanced public service provision for families.

Another way of assessing family policy differences between parties is to use an aggregated model for discerning how parties have addressed different family policy risk groups ('old' vs. 'new' risk groups) and policy strategies ('income' vs. 'labour' strategies) over time. By juxtaposing programs emanating from the period 1970-1987 and programs from the latter period, 1991-2007, we can ascertain the degree of change over time, i.e. what is new or not, in partisan family policy positions. Whereas the first period is characterised by steady economic growth and an overall expansion of family policy in Finland, the second period is characterised by economic fluctuation and frequent cutbacks in family policy benefits (cf. Forssén et al., 2008; Hiilamo, 2006). During the first half of the 90s Finland experienced negative growth, sky-rocketing unemployment figures and major cutbacks. However, in the Late-90s the economy started to recover and in the Early-2000s it had turned into a boom. This enabled the government to launch a series of piecemeal reforms that aimed at restoring the purchasing power of families that had deteriorated as a consequence of previous cutbacks. Another reason for using this distinction between periods is that it is suitable for pragmatic reasons. Since election programs for the GL became available in 1991, the party is included only in the latter time period.

As argued earlier in the article, the significance of so-called new family policy risk groups has grown considerably over time. As shown in Table 2, we see that the number of statements concerning 'new' risk groups have increased in all parties between the period 1970-87 and 1991-2007, except for the LEFT.

Table 2. The number of standpoints concerning family policy target groups in the election programmes of Finnish parties 1970-1987 and 1991-2007

WHO?	'Old' risk groups			'New' risk groups		
	1970-1987	1991-2007	Tot.	1970-1987	1991-2007	Tot.
NC	8	5	13	0	5	5
CP	10	10	20	1	9	10
SPP	7	4	11	6	8	14
SDP	6	4	10	5	9	14
LEFT	8	2	10	9	8	17
GL	n.a.	10	10	n.a.	9	9
Tot.	39	35	74	21	48	69

Note: The category 'old' risk groups is a sum variable consisting of the following (original) variables: 1 (general family standpoints), 3 (families with children) and 4 (poor or large families with children). The category 'new' risk groups is a sum variable consisting of (the original variables) 9 (children), 12 (women) and 14 (new family types).

By contrast, the number of statements concerning 'old' risk groups has fallen in all parties, except for the CP where the number has remained constant. A main characteristic for the CP (and the NC) has been its strong and continuous accentuation of the traditional family model and the role of the housewife/'home mother' (ct. Hiilamo and Kangas, 2006; Anttonen and Sipilä, 2000). Especially in the programs from the 1970s, the family was portrayed as the most basic unit of society and the gender division within the family was clearly influenced by the single-earner idea and a strong accentuation of the housewife/home-mother role. Although the idea of the family as a basic social unit still stands strong in the election programs of the conservative parties, they have also started to recognise the dual-earner model and different kinds of 'new' household types, such as single-parent families. Also the liberal SPP and the two leftist parties have focused on the family throughout the whole period, but what is characteristic for these parties is that they already in the 1990s and 1980s adopted a more diversified family view compared to the conservative parties. For instance, in the manifestos from the 1970s the LEFT strongly addressed the needs of single-parent households, gender equality and children's rights, which makes the party somewhat of a pioneer in this respect. As for the GL, no longitudinal comparisons can be made due to the lack of programs from the period 1970-1987. Nevertheless, it can be noted that the GL have developed a rather unique family policy profile that is strongly impregnated by so-called post-materialist values, such as the rights of sexual minorities, alternative life styles and gender equality (Zilliaccus, 2001). However, the key word here seems to be variety, since the CP strongly advocates public support for all families, including both traditional nuclear families and different kinds of new family forms. Table 2 thus suggests that the needs of 'new' risk groups have become more recognised by parties

alongside ‘old’ risk groups, but it also shows that this process seems to be rather similar in all parties.

As to the question of what parties think the society should do for families, Table 3 indicates another striking result that seems to be in concordance with our assumptions.

Table 3. The number of standpoints concerning family-policy policy strategies in the election programmes of Finnish parties 1970-1987 and 1991-2007

WHAT?	'Income' strategies			'Labour' strategies		
	1970-1987	1991-2007	Tot.	1970-1987	1991-2007	Tot.
NC	9	11	20	4	10	14
CP	11	9	20	4	10	14
SPP	6	4	10	8	9	17
SDP	3	2	5	6	14	20
LEFT	4	3	7	10	6	16
GL	n.a.	6	6	n.a.	11	11
Tot.	33	35	68	32	60	92

Note: The category ‘income’ strategies is a sum variable consisting of the following (original) variables: 2 (cash benefits), 5 (tax deductions) and 7 (home care allowances). The category ‘labour’ strategies is a sum variable consisting of (the original variables) 6 (public day care services), 11 (education, pre-schools) and 13 (reconciliation of work/family).

In all parties, besides the LEFT, there has been an increase in the accentuation of so-called labour strategies over time. Here the LEFT stands out somewhat as its programmatic emphasis on ‘labour’ strategies was quite strong already in the 1970s. By contrast, the focus on so-called ‘income’ strategies have somewhat declined, except for the NC where there is a slight upward trend also in terms of standpoints advocating ‘income’ strategies. Hence there seems to be a trend towards a stronger accentuation of ‘labour’ strategies in partisan election programmes that tends to supersede the role of traditional ‘income’ strategies, such as child allowances or parental-insurance benefits. Parties have generally become more inclined to supporting policy measures that aim at securing the economic well-being of families and comply with general labour-market needs by providing incentives and facilitating the labour-market participation of parents. Allegedly, labour-market participation is not only seen as a remedy for combating economic insecurity for families, it is also considered an essential requirement for sustaining economical growth and securing the necessary funding for the welfare state.

So far the results point at a growing degree of convergence over time as far as parties’ recognition of target groups and policy measures are concerned. But has there really been a convergence between partisan family policy profiles over time? In order to assess the degree of longitudinal convergence in family policy profiles, we have compared the programs from the two time periods by using a

non-parametric test of concordance, Kendall's *W*. This statistical tool helps us to assess the degree of conformity by using the parties' internal rankings of different family policy themes as starting points (see Siegel and Castellan, 1988). The coefficient that varies between 0 and 1 (the higher value, the higher degree of concordance) gives us a picture of the similarity in the ways family policy themes have been ranked according to their frequency in the respective time periods (see Table 4).

Table 4. The degree of concordance between parties' rankings of family-policy themes 1970-1987 and 1991-2007.

		1970-87 (k=5)	1991-2007 (k=6)
'Old' risk groups	(n=3)	0.693	0.398
'New' risk groups	(n=3)	0.413	0.398
'Income' strategies	(n=3)	0.093	0.583
'Labour' strategies	(n=3)	0.413	0.454
All issues	(n=14)	0.405	0.451*

Note: The degree of conformity between parties is calculated with Kendall's coefficient of concordance on the basis of parties' internal rankings of different sets of family-policy themes (k= number of parties). * = coefficient is significant at the 0.95-level.

Table 4 indicates that there has been a slight increase in overall partisan concordance between the two periods studied here. The overall coefficient of concordance changes from 0.405 in the period 1970-1987 to 0.451 in the period 1991-2007. By contrast, the degree of concordance regarding partisan recognition of family policy target groups seems to have evolved in a rather divergent way over time. A possible explanation is that the GL is included in the latter period but not in the first. Since the profile of GL differs significantly from the other parties as to its unique addressing of non-traditional target groups, like immigrant families and sexual minorities, it is likely to cause a lower value of concordance for the period 1991-2007. However, if we look at what kind of policy claims parties have made, there seems to be a quite clear trend towards convergence over time. This trend is most tangible in the case of 'income' strategies, but we can also detect a similar trend concerning 'labour' strategies. Consequently, parties seem to have become more alike in their down-playing of income transfers and their increasing emphasis on 'labour' strategies, for instance, by claiming extended public day care rights and demanding measures for facilitating parents' reconciliation of work and family. The reconciliation theme seems to have become a universally adopted policy measure among Finnish parties. Allegedly, measures to facilitate reconciliation are seen as necessary for increasing the well-being of parents, and for safeguarding that parents have enough time to spend

with their children. Indirectly this also suggests that reconciliation is seen as an inevitable condition for maintaining a high employment rate among parents and for maintaining economic growth. The increasing emphasis that parties tend to put on reconciliation measures, and on ‘labour’ strategies in general, is likely to emanate from influential policy ideas and from social learning processes within parties. The results of the analysis clearly support the argument that partisan family policy belief systems have been strongly influenced by the OECD (see OECD, 2007) and the *European Employment Strategy* although the manifestos do not convey any manifest references to these sources.

The results thus indicate that the family policy positions of Finnish parties on the whole have become more alike as we approach the 2000s. But how have distances between individual parties evolved and are there distinctive clusters of parties regarding their family policy profiles? In order to assess groupings of parties we performed a hierarchical cluster analysis on the basis of their standpoints 1970-1987 and 1991-2007 (an average linkage method based on Pearson’s correlation coefficients). The results of the analysis are presented as dendrograms (Figure 4) that show the distance between and groupings of parties in respective periods.

Figure 4 indicates a rather similar clustering order for both periods. On the one hand, there is a distinctive cluster consisting of both conservative parties (NC and CP), on the other the three remaining parties tend to form a looser cluster, where the SPP and the SDP stand closer to each other than does the LEFT. The introduction of the GL in the latter period somewhat reorganises this ‘leftist’ cluster, by diminishing the distances between the SDP, SPP and the LEFT, and by attaching the GL loosely to this cluster. Interestingly enough, the dendrograms confirm the results of previous research by showing a clear ideological cleavage between a ‘conservative’ and a ‘leftist’ family policy profile leaving the greens somewhere in the middle (e.g. Hiilamo and Kangas, 2006; Ervasti, 1996; Kangas, 1986). It also substantiates the results of the assessment of concordance by showing a more intense trend towards convergence between the leftist parties, the SPP and the greens over time, while the distance between the conservative parties tend to have become wider.

Conclusions and discussion

The overall aim of the article was to assess the impact of so-called ‘new’ social needs and post-industrialist pressures on Finnish parties’ family policy positions over the period 1970-2007. The results show that partisan family policy positions have been highly influenced by social needs of ‘new’ risk groups and that there has been an overall shift from a policy orientation that emphasises income transfers and publically provided well-being of families to an orientation more focused on increasing the labour market participation of parents by improving the

By and large, partisan interest in family policy issues has grown considerably since the 1970s. Parties have become increasingly prone to recognising the new social needs of families arising due to socio-economic changes in the Finnish society during the last decades. There has been a shift from traditional or ‘old’ target groups like families with children to ‘new’ risk groups that tend to individualise the addressee for policy-making concern. This is indicated through the massive attention that parties have given children, women, and different kinds of atypical family forms, such as single-parent households and immigrant families. However, these needs are not interpreted in similar ways; different parties tend to turn their attention to different target groups according to the fundamental normative and ontological axioms that their policy belief systems are based upon (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999). Hence conservative parties have tended to avoid questions of ‘new families’ as long as possible with reference to their strong attachment to a traditional family model with a clear division of gender roles. By contrast, liberal, leftist and green parties adopted ‘new’ social risks in an earlier stage and integrated them into their core belief systems to a higher extent.

Also regarding the question of policy orientation, the results indicate that parties belonging to different ideological spheres have advocated slightly diverging policy options. Traditionally the conservative parties tended to prefer a variety of both direct and indirect income transfers to families, whereas leftist parties generally have been more in favour of publically provided day care services for families. The NC and CP have focused primarily on strengthening the traditional family model (with the mother not working outside the home) by demanding that a ‘mother wage’ in the form of home care allowance should be paid to mothers. By contrast, the leftist parties, and partly also the SPP and GL, have strongly advocated the public provision of child-care and emphasised gender equality, which suggests a more egalitarian view on gender issues and the promotion of the dual-earner model.

These differences have, however, started to fade away as all parties have become more positively positioned towards “labour strategies” at the expense of traditional “income” strategies. There has also been a more universal acceptance of the dual-earner model. During times of increasing pressures on the welfare state and growing fiscal constraints, massive improvements of income transfers to families are seen as increasingly difficult to perform. Moreover, the impact of international policy recommendations from organisations like the OECD or the EU have received a more central role in partisan programmes, as party elites as well as decision-makers are increasingly confronted with uncertainty and the task of tackling an ever increasing demand for social welfare with scarcer public resources. It is interesting to speculate as to the impact that these observed changes in partisan position have had on the family policies carried out in Finland. Although there are no straightforward connections between partisan positions and policy outputs, we can ask whether these observed changes

represent a wider transformation of policy orientation that is not only typical for Finland but also for most advanced welfare states. A common denominator of this ‘policy re-orientation’ is a more prominent focus on activating measures and labour-market flexibility (ct. Bradshaw and Hatland, 2006; Taylor-Gooby, 2004; Esping-Andersen *et al.*, 2002). It also seems plausible to assume that one of the main factors behind this change would be that welfare states having faced common challenges, have adopted similar influential policy ideas and changed their policy systems through processes of social learning.

Finally, although the results indicate that there have been changes in partisan family policy positions since the 1970s, it should be remembered that these results only give rough estimates on the extent of ideological change. In order to assess these changes in detail, qualitative readings of more extensive material ought to be carried out.

Appendix 1. Coding manual

The overall aim of the coding process was to register occurrence of different family policy themes in election programmes during 1970-2007. The coding implied registering whether or not a certain theme occurred in a certain programme for a certain party. A certain theme was coded only once per programme, even if it occurred two or more times.

The central condition for occurrence was that a theme explicitly or implicitly concerned families (with children), parents or children and could be said to express a direct or indirect positive standpoint, e.g. claims, policy demands, critical evaluations of prevailing situations, principal declarations etc.

Thematic categories (variables):

1. General family standpoints: standpoints that concern the family, but that cannot be coded as belonging to any of the more specific categories, for example general expressions of the role of the family in society.
2. Income transfers/cash benefits to families: standpoints that concern income transfers/cash benefits to families (with children), for example child allowances. Note: Study support is coded to category 11 and home care allowance to category 7. Moreover indirect transfers, for example tax deductions, are coded to category 5.
3. Families with children: standpoints concerning the economic situation of families with children in relation to other families (so-called horizontal equality/redistribution), for example statements that support redistribution of income to families with children, or expressions of concern for the economic status of families with children. Note: statements concerning poor families or large families (with many children) are coded to category 4.

4. Poor families with children/families with many children: standpoints concerning poor families with children, families with many children or child poverty, as well as standpoints concerning the relationship between different types of families with children (so-called vertical equality).
5. Tax deductions/tax relief for families with children: standpoints concerning tax deductions/reliefs for families. Also other standpoints concerning tax deductions for families should be coded, if they are explicitly legitimated as deductions that reduces the burdens of parents, for example tax deductions for employing cleaners in the home. Note: statements concerning inheritance taxes, general tax cuts or joint/individual taxation for spouses should not be coded.
6. Public day care: statements concerning public/municipal child day care, publically provided forenoon/afternoon child-care, family day care, day care fees etc. Note: corresponding activities that are provided by NCOs, voluntary actors or the church should be coded to category 7.
7. Home care/home care allowance/privately organised care: statements concerning home care of children, home care allowances, private care, child care provided by the voluntary sector, or any other corresponding activities that promotes or home care/private care of children.
8. Excluded category.
9. Children/child policies/children's rights: statements concerning children, their rights, participation, child policies etc.
10. Child protection/child-related problems: standpoints concerning child-related problems and children's vulnerability (e.g. drug abuse, bullying, sexual abuse etc) or public measures that aim at solving similar problems, for example municipal child protection services.
11. Education/pre-schools: standpoints that concern the role of education/pre-schools as support for the child's future intellectual/economic/social development. Also statements concerning study support and equal education opportunities should be coded.
12. Women/gender equality: statements concerning the economic/social position of women, women's equal opportunities in working life or family, gender discrimination etc.
13. Reconciliation of work and family: statements that concern parent's employment, measures for facilitating the balance between work and family, for example flexible working hours etc.
14. New family forms: statements that concern so-called new or atypical family forms, for example step families, lone parents, immigrant families etc.
15. Other statements: Statements that concern any other issue pertaining to families, for example school health service, social housing for families with children etc.

References

- Anttonen, A. (1999) *Lasten kotihoidon tuki suomalaisessa perhepolitiikassa*, Sosiaali- ja terveysturvan tutkimuksia 52, Helsinki: KELA.
- Anttonen, A. and Sipilä, J. (2000) *Suomalaista sosiaalipolitiikkaa*, Tampere: Vastapaino.
- Bardy, M., Salmi, M. and Heino, T. (2001) *Mikä lapsiamme uhkaa? Suuntaviivoja 2000-luvun lapsipoliittiseen keskusteluun*, Helsinki: Stakes.
- Bartley, K. (1998) *Barnpolitik och barnets rättigheter*, Sociologiska institutionen vid Göteborgs universitet, Göteborg: Göteborgs universitet.
- Beck, U. (1986) *Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag.
- Beck, U. and Beck-Gernsheim, E. (2002) *Individualization: institutionalized individualism and its social and political consequences*, London: Sage.
- Bradshaw, J and Hatland, A. (2006) "Introduction", In J. Bradshaw and A. Hatland (eds.), *Social Policy, Employment and Family Change in Comparative Perspective*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Budge, I. and McDonald, M. (2006) "Choices Parties Define Policy Alternatives in Representative Elections, 17 Countries 1945-1998", *Party Politics*, 12 (4), 451-466.
- Budge, I. and Robertson, D. (1987) "Do Parties differ, and how?", In I. Budge, D. Robertson and D. Hearl (eds.), *Ideology, Strategy, and Party Change: Spatial Analyses of Post-War Election Programmes in 19 Democracies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Campbell, J. L. (1998) "Institutional analysis and the role of ideas in political economy", *Theory and Society*, 27 (3), 377-409.
- Castles, F. G. (2004) *The Future of the Welfare State. Crisis Myths and Crisis Realities*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Christensen, R. K. (2006) "International nongovernmental organizations: globalization, policy learning, and the nation-state", *International Journal of Public Administration*, 29 (4-6), 281-303.
- Dolowitz, D. with Hulme, R., Nellis, M. and O'Neal, F. (2000) *Policy Transfer and British Social Policy*, Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Ervasti, H. (1996) *Kenen vastuu? Tutkimuksia hyvinvointipluralismin legitimitetin näkökulmasta*, Tutkimuksia 62, Helsinki: Stakes.
- Esping-Andersen, G., Gallie, D., Hemerijck, A. and Myles, J. (2002) *Why we need a New Welfare State*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Esping-Andersen, G. (1999) *Social Foundations of Post-industrial Economies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ferrarini, T. (2006) *Families, States and Labour Markets. Institutions, Causes and Consequences of Family Policy in Post-War Welfare States*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

- Forssén, K., Jaakkola, A.M. and Ritakallio, V-M. (2008) “Family policies in Finland”, In I. Ostner and C. Schmidt (eds.), *Family Policies in the Context of Family Change*, Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Gauthier, A-H. (1996) *The State and the Family. A Comparative Analysis of Family Policies in Industrialized Countries*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Hakovirta, M. (2006) *Yksinhuoltajaäitien työllisyys, toimeentulo ja työmarkkinavalinnat*, Väestöntutkimuslaitoksen julkaisusarja D 45/2006, Helsinki: Väestöliitto.
- Hall, P. A. (1993) “Policy paradigms, social learning and the state: the case of economic policy-making in Britain”, *Comparative Politics*, 25 (3), 275-296.
- Hay, C and Rosamond, B. (2002) “Globalization, European integration and the discursive construction of economic imperatives”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 9 (2), 147-167.
- Henderson, A. and White, L. A. (2004) “Shrinking welfare states? Comparing maternity leave benefits and child care programs in European Union and North American welfare states, 1985-2000”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 11 (3), 497-519.
- Hiilamo, H. (2006) *Akantappolaista isäkiintiöön. Perhepolitiikan pitkä linja Suomessa ja Ruotsissa*, Helsinki: Stakes.
- Hiilamo, H. (2002) *The Rise and Fall of Nordic Family Policy? Historical development and changes during the 1990s in Sweden and Finland*, Stakes research reports 125, Helsinki: Stakes.
- Hiilamo, H. and Kangas, O. (2006) *Trap for women or freedom to choose? Political frames in the making of child home care allowance in Finland and Sweden*, Publications of the Department of Social Policy A:16, Turku : University of Turku.
- Hinnfors, J. (1992) *Familjepolitik. Samhällsförändringar och partistrategier 1960-1990*, Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell.
- Holsti, O. R. (1969) *Content analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities*, Reading, MA.: Adolson-Westley.
- Huber, E. and Stephens, J. D. (2001) *Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Hulme, R. (2005) “Policy Transfer and the Internationalisation of Social Policy”, *Social Policy & Society*, 4 (4), 417-425.
- Häusermann, S. (2006) “Changing coalitions in social policy reforms: the politics of new social needs and demands”, *Journal of European Social Policy*, 16 (1), 5-21.
- Kamerman, S. B. and Kahn, A. J. (2003) “Child and family policies in an era of social policy retrenchment and restructuring”, In K. Vleminckx and T. M. Smeeding (eds.), *Child well-being, child poverty and child policy in modern nations. What do we know?*, Bristol: The Policy Press.

- Kangas, O. and Ritakallio, V-M. (2005) *Different Methods – Different Trends. Poverty in Finland in the 1990s*, Department of Social Policy, Publications A:15, University of Turku.
- Kangas, O. (1986) *Luokkaintressit ja hyvinvointivaltio*, Julkaisuja D-84, Helsinki: Helsingin kauppakorkeakoulu.
- Karisto, A., Takala, P. and Haapola, I. (1998) *Finland i förvandling. Levnadsstandardens, livsföringens och socialpolitikens utveckling i Finland*, Porvoo: WSOY.
- Kitschelt, H. (2001) “Partisan Competition and Welfare State Retrenchment. When Do Politicians Choose Unpopular Policies?”, In P. Pierson (ed.), *The New Politics of the Welfare State*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Korpi, W. (2000) “Faces of Inequality: Gender, Class, and Patterns of Inequalities in Different Types of Welfare States”, *Social Politics*, 7 (2), 127-191.
- Kosonen, P. (2004) “Finland: considering OECD guidelines but within national institutional settings”, In K. Armingeon and M. Beyeler (eds.), *The OECD and European Welfare States*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Kosonen, P. (2001) “Globalization and the Nordic welfare states”, In R. Sykes, B. Palier and P. Prior (eds.), *Globalization and European Welfare States: Challenges and Change*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Kosunen, V. (1997) ”Lama ja sosiaaliturvan muutokset 1990-luvulla”, In M. Heikkilä and H. Uusitalo (eds.), *Leikkausten hinta*, Stakes research reports 208, Helsinki: Stakes.
- Krippendorff, K. (2004) *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology*, 2nd ed., Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage.
- Kuebler, D. (2007) “Understanding the Recent Expansion of Swiss Family Policy: And Idea-Centred Approach”, *Journal of Social Policy*, 36 (2), 217-237.
- Leira, A. (2006) “Parenthood change and policy reform in Scandinavia, 1970s-2000s”, in A. L. Ellingsaeter and A. Leira (eds.), *Politicising Parenthood in Scandinavia: Gender Relations in Welfare States*, Bristol: The Policy Press.
- MacInness, J. (2006) “Work-Life Balance in Europe: a response to the baby bust or reward for the baby boomers?”, *European Societies*, 8 (2), 223-249.
- Mayhew, E. (2006) “The Parental Employment Context”, In J. Bradshaw and A. Hatland (eds.), *Social Policy, Employment and Family Change in Comparative Perspective*, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
- Moisio, P. (2006) ”Kasvanut polarisaatio lapsiperheiden parissa”, in M. Kautto (ed.) *Suomalaisten hyvinvointi 2006*, Helsinki: Stakes.
- Montanari, I. (2000) “From family wage to marriage subsidy and child benefits: controversy and consensus in the development of family support”, *Journal of European Social Policy*, 10 (4), 307-333.

- Nygård, M. (2007) ”Från gammal till ny familjepolitik? Förändringen i de finländska partiernas familjepolitiska ideologier 1970-2007”, *Janus*, 15 (4), 333-356.
- Nygård, M. (2003) *Välfärdsstaten, partierna och marknaden. Den välfärdsideologiska förändringen inom fyra finländska partier under 1990-talet*, Åbo: Åbo Akademis förlag.
- OECD (2007) *Babies and Bosses: Reconciling Work and Family Life. A Synthesis of Findings for OECD Countries*, Paris: OECD.
- OECD (2004) *Labour Force Statistics 1970-2003*, Paris: OECD.
- Pierson, P. (2001) ”Post-industrial pressures on the mature welfare states”, In P. Pierson (ed.), *The New Politics of the Welfare State*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Pierson, P. (1996) ”The new politics of the welfare state”, *World Politics*, 48, 1, pp. 143-179.
- Rijken, A. (2006) ”Fertility rates in Europe: The Influence of Policy, Economy and Culture”, In J. Bradshaw and A. Hatland (eds), *Social Policy, Employment and Family Change in Comparative Perspective*, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
- Sabatier, P.A. and Jenkins-Smith, H. C. (1999) ”The advocacy coalition framework: an assessment”, In P. A. Sabatier (ed.), *Theories of The Policy Process*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
- Sainsbury, D. (1994) ”Women’s and Men’s Social Rights: Gendering Dimensions of Welfare States”, In D. Sainsbury (ed.), *Gendering Welfare States*, London: Sage.
- Statistics, Finland (2008) ”Avioliittoja ja avioeroja vähemmän”, available on-line, http://www.tilastokeskus.fi/til/ssaaty/2006/ssaaty_2006_2007-05-04_tie_001.html, retrieved, 14.4.2008.
- Statistics, Finland (2006) ”Lapsiperheissä tulot riittävät- tai sitten eivät”, available on-line, http://www.tilastokeskus.fi/tup/hyvinvointikatsaus/hyka_2006_03_ruotsalainen.html?tu (accessed 15.4.2008).
- STM [Ministry of Social Affairs and Health] (2008) ”Budget proposal for the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health improves the situation of families with children and people on small incomes – Press release 230/2008”, available on-line, <http://www.stm.fi/Resource.phx/publishing/documents/16085/index.htm>, (accessed 15.1.2009).
- STM [Ministry of Social Affairs and Health] (2007) ”Increases in maternity and parental allowances – paternity month made more flexible – Press release 557/2006”, available on-line, <http://www.stm.fi/Resource.phx/publishing/documents/9966/index.htm>, (accessed, 22.4.2008).

- STM (2006a) *Lastensuojelulain kokonaisuudistustyöryhmän muistio. Sosiaali- ja terveystieteiden ministeriön selvityksiä, 2006: 25*, Helsinki: Ministry of Social Affairs and Health.
- STM (2006b) *Social Welfare and Health Report 2006*, Helsinki: Ministry of Social Affairs and Health.
- Siegel, S. and Castellan, J. (1988) *Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences. Second Edition*, New York: Mc Graw-Hill Book Company.
- Strandberg, K. (2006) *Parties, Candidates, and Citizens On-line. Studies of Politics on the Internet*, Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press.
- Taylor, G. (2007) *Ideology and Welfare*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Taylor-Gooby, P. (2004) "New Risks and Social Change", In P. Taylor-Gooby (ed.), *New Risks, New Welfare. The Transformation of the European Welfare State*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Taylor-Gooby, P. (2001) "The Politics of Welfare in Europe", In P. Taylor-Gooby (ed.), *Welfare States Under Pressure*. London: Sage.
- Therborn, G. (1993) "The Politics of Childhood: The Rights of Children in Modern Times", In F. G. Castles (ed.), *Families and Nations. Patterns of Public Policy in Western Democracies*, Aldershot: Dartmouth.
- Timonen, V. (2003) *Restructuring the Welfare State*, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
- Van Kersbergen, K. (1995) *Social Capitalism*, London: Routledge.
- Weber, R. P. (1990) *Basic Content Analysis. 2 Edition.*, Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Wehner, C. and Abrahamson, P. (2006) "State Recognition of New Family Forms?", In J. Bradshaw and A. Hatland (eds.), *Social Policy, Employment and Family Change in Comparative Perspective*, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
- Välimäki, A-L. and Rauhala, P-L. (2000) "Lasten päivähoidon taipuminen yhteiskunnallisiin murroksiin Suomessa", *Yhteiskuntapolitiikka*, 65 (5), 387-405.
- Wennemo, I. (1994) *Sharing the Costs of Children. Studies on the Development of Family Support in the OECD Countries*, Stockholm: Swedish Institute for Social Research.
- Zilliacus, K. (2001) "New Politics in Finland: The Greens and the Left Wing in the 1990s", *West European Politics*, 24 (1), 27-54.
- Zimmerman, S. L. (2001) *Family Policy. Constructed solutions to Family Problems*, Thousand Oaks: Sage.