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Greek
Military Intelligence and the Crescent Estimating the
Turkish Threat - Crises, Leadership and Strategic Analyses,
1974-1996
The
argument advanced in this book is that Greek military
intelligence downplayed the immediate threat of a Turkish
surprise invasion of an Aegean island or an attack on
the free Cyprus Republic. Prime Ministers Papandreou
and Simitis had extremely different personalities and
their attitudes towards intelligence also varied considerably.
During the 1987 Greek-Turkish crisis under Papandreou,
Greek military intelligence provided useful information
about Turkey’s limited military preparations, and
so helped to prevent an escalation to confrontation.
During the 1996 crisis under Simitis, a serious failure
in tactical intelligence occurred. Military intelligence
failed to provide timely information of the tactical
situation and of the Turkish plan to deploy troops on
one Greek islet. This failure allowed the Turks to turn
the tables on the Greeks. It also caused a breakdown
in civil-military relations at a critical moment. As
a consequence, the prime minister seeking to avoid a
conflict and thus a possible bilateral resolution with
Turkey, accepted a short term political settlement brokered
by US President Bill Clinton. Greek and Turkish forces
withdrew from the disputed area but Athens and Ankara
continued arguing that the islets were their national
soil.
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